Research

Articles

“The Sellarsian Philosophy of Mind with a Rationality Key.” Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, 2(1): 72-100, 2026.
“Is Rationality Essential to Mind?” forthcoming, in Y. Jiang (Ed.), Analytic Philosophy in China 2026. Zhejiang University Press, 2026.
“The Very Idea of Mental Anti-Representationalism,” in Philosophy International Journal, 7(4), 2024. DOI:10.23880/phij-16000342
“An Inferentialist Account of Proper Names,” Studia Semiotyczne (Semiotic Studies), 37(1): 25-44, 2023. DOI: https://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxvii1.03
李红 & 黄如松. (2015). “推理优先于表征——布兰顿推理主义语义学研究”. 自然辩证法研究(06): 44-49. ［ “Inference Prior to Representation: On Robert Brandom’s Inferential Semantics,” with Hong Li, Studies in Dialectics of Nature, 31(6): 44-49, 2015. ］

Book Projects

Mind as Rational Relation: An Anti-Representationalist Account of Mind

In this project, I introduce and defend what I call the Relational View of Mind (Mental Relationalism). According to this view, the mind is not an entity, a state/property, or a container of them, but a relation — a rational, dynamic, patterned set of engagements that an organism sustains with its world, others, and itself. This view reorients our understanding of mind away from representationalism and reification, toward a model that is normative, embedded, emergent, or ecological.

Status: Proposal favorably reviewed by two external reviewers at Bloomsbury Academic; editorial-board consideration for a contract pending.

Introduction to Philosophy (Twenty Chapters, in Chinese)

《哲学导论》（共二十章）

Status: Draft done.

Special Issue, Guest Editor, in progress

Guest Editor. “Mind without Inner Representation? Psychological Discourse, Rationality, and Mental Anti-Representationalism.” Special Issue of Journal of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy. (See also PhilEvents.)

Confirmed or provisionally confirmed contributors: William Lycan, Paul Horwich, Adam Toon, Willem deVries, Jesse Prinz, Peter Mandik, James O’Shea, Simon Blackburn (interested), and Robert Matthews.

JCCP_Huang Special Issue Online Download

Dissertations

Dissertation (University of Florida, 2023): Mental Anti-Representationalism: Prospects for a Noncognitivist Account of Psychological Discourse. (Huang, Rusong. University of Florida ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2023. 30490881.)

内容简介

在这篇博士论文中，我提供了一种关于我们心灵的新的解释框架。我们对于心灵的通常理解如下：

像「尤三姐思嫁柳二郎」之类的句子，指的是尤三姐心里有个「嫁给柳二郞」这样的想法。心里的想法，正如河里的鱼一样。其不同只不过是别人有可能看到河里的鱼，而我心里的想法只有我自己知道而已。又或者，像「腿很痛」之类的句子，它与「雪很白」之类的句子是属于同一类的句子。讲「雪很白」，我们指雪有「白色」这种性质；讲「腿很痛」，我们指腿有「疼痛」这种性质。

我在论文中提供了一种对于以上这类有关心灵的句子的新的解释。其大致想法如下：

我们有关心灵的句子与纯粹描述的句子有本质的不同：描述句的意思由它所指的事实决定，而心灵句的意思则不是。心灵句本质上是某种与我们人的理解有关的句子。「尤三姐思嫁柳二郞」并不是指我们看不见的尤三姐心里的想法，而是指我们承认尤三姐在她那种情况下嫁于柳二郞是件可理解的事情；「腿很痛」也不是指腿痛这样的事实，而是指我们承认在某些情况下有某种表现（比如「走路一瘸一拐的」）是件可理解的事情。

博士论文(北师大, 2016)：经验之为直观与概念的统一——以「匹兹堡学派」为中心的探讨。［ Experience as a Synthesis of the Intuitional and the Conceptual: An Investigation of the Pittsburgh School. Beijing Normal University Dissertation, 2016. ］